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In the Supreme Court of the Stale et Utah 
SUGARHOUSE FINANCE COM-
P ANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
a corporation, 
Def end ant and Respondent, 
and 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COM-
P ANY, a corporation, 
Defendant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
XATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11029 
This is the second action brought by appellant 
against respondent and defendant Walker Bank & Trust 
Company to recover fonds allegedly disbursed on checks 
drawn on appellant's account with defendant Walker 
Bank & Tnu;t Company after having been presented to 
and honored by respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,iVER C01JRT 
Rt:>SJJOndent does not agree with two statements in 
nppellant's brief n~garding the disposition of the case 
m the lower court. First, the Complaint which is the 
~ubject of this appeal, although dated Februar.\" G, 19G7, 
was actually filed April 10, 19G7, and second, respondt>nt 
(•]aims the dismissal of the first case ·was with prejudiee. 
R<'spondent "'ill, tlwrefore, restate the disposition of tlH> 
(•ase in the lmn•r court. 
.Ap]wllant filed a Complaint against rPspondPnt and 
def Pndant vValker Bank & 'I'rrn;;t Compan.\- which was 
dismissed as to respondent. Appellant filed a Pdition 
for lntPrmediate Appeal from this dismisiml whieh was 
dPnit>d and, therPafkr, on April 10, 19G7, appellant filed 
n new Complaint against rPspondPnt and <lefondant 
"'Walker Bank & 'I1rust Company. Upon respondent's mo-
tion the second Complaint ·was dismissed as to respond-
ent on August 30, 1967, and it is from this Order of 
Dismissal of tlw second Complaint that ap1w1lant lias 
appeale<l. 
HE>spondent s<•Pks an affirmation of tht- OrdPr or 
Dismissal 1::•nten•cl h~- tlw lowPr eonrt. 
~'l'ATK~TKNT o~~ FACTS 
FIH~T CO~lPLAl:'.\'T: 
On Augnst ~(i, 1%(i, npp<>llant fil(•d a Complaint in 
the Third .Jndi<·inl [fo:trid Court i11 and for ~:lit Lak(• 
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County, State of Utah, against respondent and defendant 
Walker Bank 'J1rust Company, Case No. 166815. The 
allegations of this first Complaint must be analyzed 
here since they hear on the disposition of the second 
Complaint. 
The first Complaint alleged two causes of action 
against respondent. Count I of the First Cause of Action 
in suhstanee alleged that 32 cheeks, endorsed with signa-
tnrPs otlwr than those of the named payees, were drawn 
11pon a1qwl1ant's aeeou11t \Yith deft>ndant ~Walker Bank 
& 'l'ni:-:t Cmnpan~' nnd presPnted to respondent hy one 
Cu~- K DaYis, 01· his ag<~nt, for deposit. None of the 
<'hecks werf• payahl(" to Davis, hut they were cr0dited hy 
n·spondE>nt to an aceount or aieeounh~ bPlonging to Davis. 
Based upon tht>se all0ged facts, appellant claimed that 
l'PspmHlPnt was negligent in honoring the checks pre-
sented to it in ( l) failing to cornparP the endon1emrnts on 
Ute elwcks with the signature (•ard of Davis; (2) failing to 
1·pqnire thP enclors<'nwnt of Davis or the prrson de-
positing tlw chPcks: and ( :i) failing to reeognize a scheme 
\\'hi('h would ha-w hc•en diselost>d hy thP multiplicity of 
transnetions. As a result of the allt>ged negligence, appel-
lant elairned tliat it snffrn•d damage in the amount of 
~;1 ;>o.2(i:-l. ( n. ~31. ::'.'? i. 
C'ount I I of t!tP First Causc> of A'C'tion alleged that 
t lw c'rnlor:,;l'li1rnt:-< on tl1<' clw('ks wPrp forgPriei', and that 
d<•c;pi t" 1 lH' forgf•riPs, rP:,;pondPn1 honored the chec•ks, in 
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violation of a duty to appellant to determine the genuine-
ness of the t>ndorst>menh;, and that as a rt>sult then•of, 
appellant was damaged in the amount of $150,265. (R. 32, 
33). 
The Rt>cond Cause of A('tion of tht> fin;;t Complaint 
c·laimed that in ::\lay, 1963, thrt>e elwcks totali-ng $-+7,000 
WPre drawn against appellant's aeeonnt with clef Pndant 
\Valker Bank & Trust Company signed by Davis and 01w 
other employee of appellant, payable in two instanePs to 
respondPnt and in one instanee to re>spondent and a pa~·pe 
known as Treasur<• ~lountain Finanee. Tlw Second Cans<> 
of Aetion further alleged that om~ of tht> checks was erPd-
ited by respondent to tlw aeeount of 1'rr>asure ~lountain 
]1Jnterprises, a sole proprietorship of Davis, and that t\rn 
of the cht>cks ·were credited by respondent to the account 
of Tn~asnre Mountain Finance, another solP proprietor-
ship of Davi;,;. App<->llant tlwn alleged that respondent 
was nt>gligPnt in failing to aet in a rc->asonable and prndPnt 
rnannPr eonsistent with hanking standards in the an-'a 
in transfrrrinµ: fnnd:-; lwlonginp: to appPllant to DaYis 
without n•qui ring mi~· dPrnonstration of authority for 
tlu· transfrr arnl \\·ithout rPqui ring tl1<' <>ndorsPrnent ol' 
Davis. (R ::rn, :H). Tlie Third CausP of Aetion was di-
rPeted only against dPfrndant \ValkPr Bank & Trust Com-
}Jany and is not in\'f1ln'n }H'T'<'. 
On Oetoher 1 U, 1 !J(i(), l'Psp<md(•nt l'i l<'d a Motion to Dis-
miss thP first Complaint arnl atta<'hPd an Affidavit jdPnti-
fying Davis as app<'llm1t',, manaµ:Pr. A 1).;·nmPnt \\·a,-: 1H•:H1l 
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on the Motion to Dismiss, and on January 12, 1967, the 
Court signed and entered its Order of Dismissal in Civil 
No. 1GG815. The Order was prepared with the following 
language included: 
'' ... plaintiff's Complaint against defendant Zions 
First National Bank be, and the same hereby is, 
di·smissed ·with prejudice on the ground ... " 
Appellant objected to the inclusion of the words "with 
prejudice," claiming that the dismissal was without preju-
dicP. 'T'lH' <lnestion wlwtJwr tlH~ words "with prejudice" 
or "without prPjndiN.''' should he in the Order was sub-
mitted to tlw Court, and thP words "dismissed with preju-
dic0'' were crossed out hv the Court and onlv the word . . ~-
"dismissed" inserted. The Order of Dismis·sal reads: 
..... plaintiff's Complaint against defendant Zions 
First National Bank he, and the same hereby, is 
dismissed on the gronnd ... " (R. 39). 
Appellant filed Petition for IntPnnediate .Appeal from 
this OrdPr of Dismissal whirh was denil•fl. 
~EC~OND C'O:\IPLAL\'"T: 
On April 10, 19()7, appellant filPd a new Complaint 
in tlw Third .Tudieial ffo-;trict Conrt in and for Salt Lake 
Count)' aµ:ainst rPspornh•nt and flpfendant vValker Bank 
& Trust ('ornpany. Cast' No. 17140(). It is this case that 
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is now before this Court on appeal. Appellant's hrief on 
pages 4, 24 and 25 refers to the ne\Y Complaint in ca~w 
No. 171406 as an Amended Complaint. 'This is an incor-
rect reference. The pleading was not an Amended Com-
plaint, but a new Complaint in a nPw action. (R 1-S). 'l'lw 
new Complaint also contajns three cam;es of action, the 
first two direeh•d against respondt~nt. All nine para-
graphs in Count I of th0 First Cam.;0 of Action in tl1l' 
first Complaint are repeated vPrhatim in the correspond-
ing Count of thf' new Complaint. Exactly the same all(•-
gations of fact involving the acceptance hy rPspondent of 
the :32 check£' and their deposit in acc·ounts owned by 
Davis are made to support a claim of neglig·ence (R. 1, 2), 
and the new Complaint then adds the following allega-
tions: 
"9. That the honoring of said clwcks with 
knowledge of the ahove and foregoing facts 
amounts to had fajth on the part of the defendant, 
Zions First National Bank. 
''10. That the def Pndant, Zions .B~irst Na-
tional Bank, imid on sueh <>hecks with actual 
knowlPdg1~ that Ouy E. Davis was committing a 
brt>aeh of his fi(hwiary obligation in making a 
dt'posit of sueh eheeb." (H. 2). 
Count 11 of thP Virst CansP of Action of th<· nt>w Com-
plaint also rPpPats Pxactly all six paragraphs of tlw 
<·orrpsponding Count of tlw first CoHIJllaint allPging in 
f'nhstancr· that tl11• <·ndorf'PHWnts on tlw :3:2 elweks \\'('l'l' 
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forgPriPs and that respondent hreached a duty to deter-
minP the genuineness of the endorsements. (R. 2, 3). The 
new Complaint adds one paragraph to this Count, alleg-
1 Ilg": 
"5. 'I'hat the failure to 1wrform the duty 
with knowledgP of the facts alh~ged in Count I of 
this Complaint amounts to had faith on the part of 
the defendant, Zions First National Bank." 
The Second Cause of Action in the new Complaint is iden-
tical with the Second Canst> of Action in the first Com-
plaint except that fivP words have been added to 
paragraph G. The Seeond Cause of Action involves three 
checks in tlw total amount of $47,000, one of which was 
payable to rPspondt.•nt and Treasure Mountain Finance 
and two of whieh WeI'P payah)e only to rt•spondent. rro 
tl1e claim of negligPncP, appellant addPd "and acted in 
had faith." 
On ~la)· 4, 19G7, rt>spondent filPd a Motion to Dismiss 
tlH• IW\\" 'Colllplaiut in CasP No. 171-to<i and attaehed to 
the ~'lotion r<>rtified eopiPs of tltf' Complaint in Case No. 
l (j()81 ;j and tlu· Ord<•r of Dismissal of that Complaint. 
(H. 12-:n ). F'ollowing arµ;urnent on this Motion to Dis-
llliss, tlw Court entPrPd an Order of Dismissal on August 
:lo, mm, disrnissiJJµ; t]1e Complaint as to rPspondent in 
CasP No. 17140<i. ( H. :.?!\ :.W). Tlw Ord Pr was prepared 
ineluding the wonls ''dismis;.;;Pd \\·ith prejndire," and 
apJH•Jlant made no oli.iection to th<' inelusion of the words 
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"with prejudice." This appeal was then taken from the 
Order of Dismissal in Case No. 171406. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S FIRST COM-
PLAINT IN CIVIL NO. 166815 BARS APPELLANT 
FROM MAINTAINING THE INSTANT ACTION 
SINCE THE CLAIMS OF APPELLANT IN THE 
INSTANT CASE ARE RES JUDICATA BETWEEN 
APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT. 
The legal effect of the Order of Dismissal of appel-
lant's first Complaint in Case No. 166815 was a judgment 
on the merits of the Complaint and, therefore, a dismissal 
with prejudice. The Motion to Dismiss the first Com-
plaint was based on the grounds that it failed to state 
n claim against respondent upon which relief could be 
granted and failP<l to state a elaim against respondent 
upon whirh relief eonld he granted by reason of thP 
applieation of tlw provisions of Title 22, Chapter 1, 
l:.C.A.(1953). Tlw Motion was made pursuant to Rnle 
12(b), U.R.C.P., and has attaehed to it an Affidavit 
setting forth the fad that Davis was appellant's manager. 
(R. 37). r111w atta('lrnwnt of the Affidavit allowed the 
lo"·er court to trPat th<' Motion und~·r Rule 56, -C.R.C.P. 
The Motion was grant<>d and the Order of Dismissal 
prepared with tlw words ''dismissed "'ith prejndicP" in-
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eluded. Appellant objected to the words "with prejudice," 
and the lowt>r court struck from the Order "dismissed 
with prejudice" and inserted only the word "dismissed," 
rPfusing to add "without prejudice." Pnder these circum-
::tances, the Order was that the Complaint was dismissed, 
with the question wlwther with or without prejudice 
n•sting on the application of tlw law to a dismissal under 
Uules (12b) and 56, U.R.C.P. 
Rule 4l(b ), U.R.C.P., with reference to the effect 
of an involuntary dismissal, in part provides: 
" ... Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, the dismissal under this sub-
division and any dismissal not provided for in this 
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 
or for improper vemw, or for lack of an indispen-
sible party, operates as an adjudication on the 
merits.'~ 
Counsel for respondent has bf'en unable to find a l;tah 
case on tht> question of the application of the quoted 
portion of Rul<-~ -11 (h), F.H.C.P., to a motion to dismiss 
a complaint rn1der Rule 12(h), U.R.C.P. However, our 
Hule 41(b) is similar to Rule H(h), :F'.R.C.P., and in the 
case of Wi11eqor z:. Slim Olsen, Inc., 12:! Ftah 487, 252 
P.:Zd 205, involving a Hnle -1-l(b) question, this Court 
stated that dPeisions construing similar Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure could he properly examined in cases 
i1ffoh'in.g the rtah Rul0s. 
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The federal courts on occasion have dealt ·with the 
question whether a dismissal under Rule 12(b), F.R.C.P. 
is a ruling on the merits of a case and, therefore, with 
prejudice. In Sardo v. McGrath, 196 F. 2d. 20, the court 
recognized that the granting of a motion to dismiss would 
result in a ruling on the nwrits. In that case, plaintiff 
brought suit for declaratory judgment against defendant 
to det(•rmine the validity of an order affirming a depor-
tation orclc•r. The district court di~nnissed the Complaint 
with prejudice, and in doing so, relied upon certain 
memoranda of points and authorities out·side the plead-
ings which containf'd assertions of fact. The Circuit Court 
reven1ed the dismissal on the ground that the fad alleged 
in the memoranda could not he properly com;idered in 
ruling on a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(h), F.R.C.P. 
However, on the point in question here, the Court 
acknowledged that propt'r dismiss1als under Rule 12(b ), 
F.R.C.P., were with prejudiee. The Court said: 
"We condude that the Order hehrw was not om\ 
for summary judgment, hut was what the Distrid 
Court :;;aid it was: 'an order dismissing the Com-
plaint with prejudict>.' Nor can we accept the view 
that dismisHal 'v.~ith prejudi(·e' lends support to tlu-' 
argument that summary judgnwnt waH g·1<antPd. 
'The Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim 
rnises1 matffr in bar and, if sustai•npd 1rithout 
lea1·e f.o proceed further, results in judgment on 
the merits.'" (ErnphasiH added). 
Similar recognition of the effeet of a dismissal under 
12(b), F.R.·C.P., wa;-; givPn in Mullen /'. Fitz Sinwns & 
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( 'onnell. DrPdge and Dock Co., 172 F. 2d. 601, wlwre th<~ 
Court of Ap1wals for the Seventh Circuit in dicta con-
~idered the question whetlwr a dismissal pursuant to a 
motion rnade unde>r Rule 12(h), F.R.C.P., results in a 
.indgrnent on the nwrits. In that casr, plaintiffs filed 
separate aetions againp,t defendant for in;jnries incurred 
11>" them whilt· in defon<lant's employ. 'rlw C"ases involvc•d 
illl~ntical issues and were argued together. The Com-
plaints alleged claims under the ,Jones Act and in the 
nlt<•rnativt' under eornrnon law negligence doctrines in 
maritime law. Defendant filed motions to dismiss for 
f'ailnrP to state claims upon which relief could he granted. 
ThP District Court granted the 111otions and ordered that 
tilt> suits he disrnisr-w<1, without prejudice. On appeal, the 
('OUrt noted that thP ground for dismissal in each ease 
\\·as failurP to statt• a ('lairn upon which relief could he 
grnnt0d, hut that the aixnnwnts advanced, to ~mstain the 
dismis:-·ml, rested, not upon a failure to state a claim upon 
whieh relief could he granted, hut upon misjoinder of 
e]aims, failure to PIPet lwtween mutua1ly exclusive causes 
of action, \\T<mg <·hoic·e of fonun and various formal de-
feds. Tlw Cireuit Conrt rPv<>rst>d tlw dismissals and, 
with n·s1wd to th<' dfed of a flismissal npon motion, 
:-' a.i c1 : 
·•\\.t• assiuue that thP foreµ;oing is also a fair state-
11wnt of the issu<'s prt>st>ntt>d to tlw District Court 
in support of tile motions to dismiss tlw aetions. 
In onr opinim1, tlw~' rornplPtt>ly rnistake the fnne-
t ions or t lie motion to dismiss for failure to stat(~ a 
<·lai111. _h· -,·frtfc·r/ i11 :2 Jfnor1·\: Federal Pructicc, 
12 
2d. Ed., par. 1209 at p. 2257, 'The Motio.n to Dis-
m.iss for failure to state a claim raises matter in 
bar and, if su.stained im'.thout foave to plea.d fur-
ther, results in a .iudgme>nt on the merits.'" (Em-
phasis added). 
The function of a motion under Rule 12(h), F.R.C.P. 
to provide a method for a determination with prejudice of 
the nwrits of a Complai•nt was acc(•pted in L. R. vVifsoiu, 
Jiu-. r. Federal Comn11111ications Conzmission. 170 F. 2<l 
793, where the eourt said: 
"A demurrer at the common law (or a motion 
to dismiss, the substitute in present Federal Court 
practice for the demurrer) is not a mere proced-
ural nieety. On the contrary it is a precise instru-
ment for final determination on the merits of the 
jnsticibility under iwrtinent rules of law of an 
nsserte>d cause of aC'tion or defense. Sustaining a 
d(~mmTer pnts the part 'ag-aim;t whm;p pleading- it 
i·s dire>rtt~d }H'rmanently out of ronrt, unless he is 
allowed to amend and ean amend.'' 
In 2 Moore's Federal Practict>, 2d Ed. par. 12.09, p. 2257, 
the> writt>r notes that Rule 12 ( b) (G), F.R.C.P., is pro1wrly 
integrafrd with Rule 5G, 1''.R.C.P., sinct> motions under 
both raise only matters on the merits of the easP. TliP 
granting of an i<lN1tieal rnotion against tlie seeond Con1-
µlaint was rel·o1.mizNl by ~ll>Jwllant as lwinµ; with pre.in-
diee. 
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Since tlw dismissal on the first Complaint was a 
final judgment, the matters set forth in the new Com-
plaint are res judicata between appellant and respond-
Pnt. Appellant allegvd but one invasion of his rights 
in both Complaints. 'The question of appellant's right to 
recover against respondent for that invasion was litgated 
in the first lawsut. In Knight v. Flat Top Miming Com-
pany, G (~tah 2d 51, 305 P.2d 50?,, the court stated that 
isf'ues concerning ~whirh a party or his privy had had an 
opportunity to litigatt> in a prior action, could not be 
rPorwne<l in a snhseqnent suit. The Court said: 
.. 'It is a fundamental prineiple of jurispru-
dence that material facts or queHtions which were 
in issue in a former aetion, and were there ad-
mitted or judicially determined, are rondusively 
settled by a judgment rendered therein, and that 
such facts or questions become rps judicata and 
may not again he litigated in a subsequent action 
between the same parties or their privies, n•gard-
less of the form the issue may take in the subse-
quent action .... ' 
"'rhe Bl'ehive claimants having had an op-
portunity to dt'fend their title to their e.laims in 
that ease had they so desired and having failed 
to do so were precluded from relitigating the same 
issues in the instant case in so far as the rig·hts of 
the sam<-.• partiPs or thPir snc·eessors in intl'rest are 
conCf'l'nNl. ·~ 
On<' all<:.•p;t>d inva::-ion of rights cannot }w nt'ed by ap-
1 wllnnt to ::-nh.iPC"t l'PSJl<inclr•nt to one ~nit aftl'r another. In 
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11'illiamsou i·. ColumlJia Gas & El('ctric Co., 18() li'.2d .J.G-1. 
the rourt dealt with this question and said: 
" ... The plaintiff having alleged operative 
facts which state a eause of action becam;p ht> t<'lb 
of defendant's rniseondud and his own harm has 
had his day in eourt. l le dOPs not get another cla>· 
aftPr the first la"Tsuit is eonelm1Pd l>y giving a 
diffon•nt n'ason than ht> gavP in tht' first for 
recovery of damages for the same invasion of his 
rights. rrhe problem of his rights against the de-
fendant hased upon the alleged wrongful acts is 
fully' bPfor<' tlw eourt whether all tlw reasons for 
reC'oVPry wel'P stated to the rourt or not.'' 
The g01wrally reeogni:r.ed S<'OJl<:> of t1w doctrine is :-;pt 
forth in 30 A Am. J11r., .l11dqmcnts, Ree. :372, p. ·HG, wlwrP 
it is stated: 
"The phase of the doctrinP of res judicata prP-
eluding suhRPquPnt litigation of the saint> cam;e of 
action is 11meh hroadPr in its application than a 
(h~tNrnination of tlw quPRtions involwd in the 
prior aetion; the conelusivPness of the judgrnpnt 
in sueh ea:-;p PXt<·nds not onl;'>' to mattPrs aduall>· 
determin<>d, hut also to other matt<•rs whiC'l1 <'onld 
prorH'rl:-' Jrnv<· lH·c·n <1<'t<·1·rni1wd in ilt<> llrior :1<'-
ti OJl. 
The .:\fotion to Dis1ui~s th(• fir~t C'oniplaint ac·c·eptPd 
tltP l'n('ts pl('ad<•d a~ tnw for purpo:-\(''"' ,,i· tlH· 1noti011 and 
:.1c1dt·(•ssPd it:-c<•lf t() tl1'' :-\lll1~tanl iY(• 111<·ril:-c of tl1<• <'l:1i111_ 
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merits in the lower court, and such dismissal must he 
with prejudice, and the matter is res judicata between the 
partit>s. Appellant's remedy for the first dismissal, if a 
rt>nwd~r <1xists, lies in an appeal to this Court from that 
flismissal and not in the filing of a new lawsuit. 
POINT II 
THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION OF 
APPELLANT'S SECOND COMPLAINT FAIL TO 
STATE A CLAIM AGAINST RESPONDENT UPON 
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED BY REASON 
OF TITLE 22, CHAPTER 1, U.C.A. (1953). 
It is conceded hy appellant that Davis was its. man-
ager and had authority to sibrn checks for it. (Appellant's 
Brit>f pp. 8, 14-). rrhe Uniform Fiduciaries Act, Section 
22-1-1, U.C.A. (1953), defines the term fiduciary as fol-
low!': 
••'Fiduciary' includes a trustee of any trust, 
<1xpressf•d, implied, re~mlting or constructive, exe-
cutor, administrator, guardian, consevator, cur-
ator, re<·eiver, trustee in hankruptey, assignee for 
the benefit of rreditors partner, agf•nt, officer of 
a corporation, public or private, public officer, 
or any other pt>rson aeting in a fiduciary capacity 
for any person, trust or <1state.'' 
As manag<>r of appellant Davis clearly was (l) its agent; 
(2) an offi<-er of tlw eoq)()ration: and (3) a per:;on acting 
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in a fiduciary caparity, and the inclusion of Davis in any 
one of those three categories. is sufficient to bring n'-
spondent's dealings with Davis -within the purview of 
Title 22, Chapter 1, F.C.A. (\953). In a closely analagous 
ease under the same statute, Fiddity and Deposit Co. 
of Md. v. Marion Nat'l. Bank, 6-1 N.E. 583, the rourt held 
that an employee who ·was authorizPd to endorse for 
deposit or negotiation all negotiable instnmwnts arnl 
ord~rs for pa~mient to his employer ·was a fiduc,iary 
within the meaning of this aet. Tht> rule of the Fidelity 
and Deposit case enrmnpasses the fartual relationship 
existing hehve<'n Davis and ap1wllant in the instant casL' 
and the same result should be reached. 
COUNT I OF FIRST CA USE O:B, ACTION: 
Count I of the First Cause of Action alleges tlwt 
3:2 checks, endorsNl "'ith signatures other than those of 
the named pa~'ei:>s, WPre drawn npon appellant's account 
·with defendant \\'alkPr Bank & rrrnst Cornpan~, and 
presrnted to n•spon<lt>nt h~· Davis or his agent for deposit 
and erPditP<l hy n•spond<>nt to nn arconnt or a.(·eo1mts 
O\n1t>d h~' Davis. ~mw of tlw <'llP('ks wel'P payahl<' to 
Davis. DasPd npon tli<>s<' a!Pg:at!ons of fact ap1wllant 
allrg('S tltat rt..·spondt'nt was nt-glig1•nt in ( 1) failing to 
eom}Yal'<' th<' ·<·ndors<'nwnts on tl1<• <·ht'<·l~s with tltP signa-
tnrP of Davis; ( :2) in failing to n·qnirP tlw Pnd(lrsp111Pnt 
of the iwrson <l<'positi11g- th<· ('}w<'k or th<• 1wrson to \Yhom 
(']"edit was µ;iv<·n; HlHl (:n in fail inµ: to r<'<·ognizP a sehernt> 
\\'liieh \nrnlcl lim·1· h(•Pn cl'.s1·lc>s<'d hy (]1<· 1uuliipli<';t:· ,,f 
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transactions. Count I then alleges that knowledge of the 
foregoing facts constitutes bad faith and that respondent 
had actual knowledge that Davis was committing a breach 
of his fiduciary ohlig·ation. 
It is clear that the ('laim of negligence fails to state 
a claim against respondent upon which relief can be 
granted. Section 22-1-9, IT.C.A. ( 1953), as applicable here 
provides: 
"lf a fiduciary makes a deposit in a bank to 
his personal credit . . . of checks drawn by him 
upon an account in the name of his principal, if he 
is empowerPd to draw checks thereon ... or if he 
otherwise makes a deposit of funds held by him 
as fiduciary, tlw bank receiving such deposit is 
not bound to inqure whether the fiduciary is com-
mitting thereby a breach of his obligation as fidu-
ciary; and the bank is authorized to pay the 
amount of thf' deposit or any part thereof upon 
the personal check of the fiduciary without being 
liable to tlH• prineipal, actual knowledge that the 
fiduciary is rommitting a breach of his obligation 
as fiduria.ry in making :mch deposit or drawing 
such check, or with knowledge of sud1 facts that 
its action in rt•ceiving the deposit or paying the 
eheck arnounh• to bad faith.'' 
The farts allPge<l by appf'llant in Count I as a matter 
of law fall short of t>stahlishing bad faitJi. Paragraph 9 
stah-s: 
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"9. That the honoring of s1aid checks with 
Immdedge of the above and foregoing facts 
amounts to bad faith on the part of the defendant, 
Zions First National Bank." 
Section 22-1-1, U.C.A. (1953) defines good faith m the 
following language : 
"A thing iH done in 'good faith' when in faet 
it is done honestly, whether it is done negligently_ 
or not." 
The courts have looked to this definition of good faith to 
determine the meaning of the term bad faith in the Uni-
form Fiduciaries Act. In Colby v. Riggs National Bank, 
92 F.2d 183, the court said that acts done ":rith knowledge 
of such facts as amounts to had faith under the Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act lllPans acts done dishont>stly in vit>I\' 
of the definition of good faith in the act. The case of 
Davis r. I'em1sylra11ia Co. for lns11rm1ces on Lives mul 
Oranfillff Am111if i<'s, 12 A.:M ()(i, <lea.It with the nwaning· 
of bad faith as nsP<l in sN·tion !J of thl' act, tlw same see-
tion as ~ection :2:2-l-!), CC.A. (1~lil:\). TIH• court sai<l that 
men• failnn' to 111ak(' inquir:,, <'YPn tl10ug-li tlwn-' ar<> sus-
pieious eirC'm11stanr<>s, d<ws not constitute had faith unlPss 
the faih1rP i:-; dtw to a fh·lilH•rat<' desirP to Pvade knowl-
edgP lw('au:-;c• of f<•nr 1ltat inqnir:, would (lisc·los1• a vieP 
ur <lefrd in tlt1· tnm:-;adion, and that a thing i:-; <lone in 
had faith, within tliP 111Paning- of tl1<> ad, only wl1Pn it is 
(lonP dishonest l:\. /\, J>JH'llant ':-; allPgatious in Count I do 
11ot s<>t fort11 l"a<'1,: tli~it e111d<l <·omditu1L• or support a 
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claim of dishonesty on the part of respondent, and the 
acts of respondent of which appellant complains are, as 
a matter of law, within the protection afforded respond-
ent under Rection 22-1-~), F.C.A. (1953). 
The allrgation in paragraph 10 of Count One that 
n•spond<>nt paid on Sll<'h elwcks with actual knowledge 
that Davis was committing a breach of his fiduciary obli-
gation in making a deposit of such checks pleads a con-
clusion that is not supported hy facts alleged in the 
Count. Appellant has not plead supporting facts of 
which it elaims r<>spon<lPnt had knowledge that would 
constitute or support a claim of actual knowledge of a 
brPach of Davis' fiduciary obligation. Facts 11,ecessary 
to support a dairn of actual knowledge must be of a 
more eulpahh• nature than facts necessary to establish 
had faith, and since appellant's allegations in Count I 
fail to support tlH' claim of had faith, they cannot sub-
stantiate the ronrlusion of actual knowledge. Since Count 
I fail.s to state a claim against respondent upon which 
relief ean be grant<'d ht>emu;e of tlw application of Section 
22-1-~), r.C.A. ( 1 D;)3), tlw lower con rt properly granted 
rt>spondent's :\lotion to Dismiss as to this Count. 
Count II of tht> Fin;;t Cause of Action alleges that 
the Pnd.orsPrnPnh..: on tht> 32 checks in question wPre 
1mauthoriz.ed forgPries, an<l that rt>spondent honorPd the 
<'hecks despite the forgeries m violation of a duty to 
determine the genuineness of the c>ndonwments. Appel-
lant then claims that the hr(>Jach of the duty with knowl-
edge of the facts alleged in Count I constituted had faith. 
Dishonesty on the part of respondent is not alleged. 
Count II also fails to state a claim against respondent 
npon whieh relief can be granh~d heeause the facts alleg-ed 
do not support a elaim of liad faith which requires that 
bad faith amount to cfo.;honesty under Seetion 22-1-9, 
r.c.A. (19!)~). Colby v. Ri,qqs, supra, Davis V. Pennsyl-
'/J(lnia Company Insurances on Lices and Gramting A•nnii-
ities. supra. 
SECOND CAFRE OF AC1'ION: 
The 8Peond Cause of Adion involvPs thrf'P ehecks 
allegedl~' drawn hy Davis aiul anotlwr <•rnployt'P of app<·l-
lant on appr>llant's ae<'onnt \\'ith dd<"ndant ·walker Ba11k 
& ri'rust Cornpany. Two of thP ('hl'c·ks w<>rr> payalilP only 
to respond<•nt arnl om· eh<'f'k was payahlP to r<'sp01Hk•11t 
and a c•o111pany known as Tn•asnt·p :\lmrntai11 !•'ina11<·<·. 
It is all<'g<>cl that th<·~;p <'h<'<'ks WPr<' dPpositPd with n•-
s.pondPi1t in U<'C'onnts o\\·1w<l h)' Davis, and. that in trans-
forrinp; funds in tllf• fon·g·oinp; fashion \\'ithout n'qui ring· 
nn~' d<>mm1strntion of autltorit)· for tlw transfer or tlw 
(•ndorsPlll<>nt of DaYis, r<'sponclvnt \\·a~ nc'g-ligPnt and 
acted in bnd faith. 
As prPviousl>' not<•<l tli<· altPgation~ of n<'µ;lip;<·rn•\• 
fail to stat<> n <'In im n!!.·n i m~t n'~pond< ·11t n pon \\'hi<' h n· l i <' f' 
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ran he granted. Section :22-1-9, U.C.A. (1953), supra .. In 
addition tlw allegations of the Second Cause of Action 
do not constitute had faith in that no facts amounting to 
dishon0sty arP alleged. Colby v. Ri,q9s National Ban,k, 
:-:npra; Davis u. Pennsyh·nnia for Insi1rances on Lives 
und Granting A11n11ities, supra. An allegation that the 
!'Pspondent shoukl havP made inquiry from its knowledge 
of the facts alleged, where a willful and deliherate eva-
sion of knowledge> is not alleged, does not constitute bad 
faith under the :;;tatutf'. Transport Trucking Company 
r. First National Bank, :~00 P.2d 47G. The Second Cause 
of Action was properly dismissed on respondent's mo-
tion. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT HAD NO DUTY TO APPELLANT 
TO DETERMINE THE GENUINENESS OF PRIOR 
ENDORSEMENTS, AND APPELLANT'S CLAIM 
THAT THE CHECKS WERE FORGERIES DOES NOT 
STATE A CLAIM AGAINST RESPONDENT UPON 
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. 
Point l U of appellant's brief argues at l<'ngth that 
the <·lweh involved in the ease were forgt•d instruments 
ratlwr than lwan•r papPr. Count II of tlw First Cam;e 
of A('tlon allPg<'s that the endorsenwnts were forged, 
and respon<lPnt di<l not dispute this allegation for pur-
poses of its :\lotion to Dis111iss and does not <lispuh• it 
on this appeal. lloweYPl", as a mntter of law respondent 
is not liable to appellant for accPpting for deposit forged 
instruments from appellant's fiduciary in the absense of 
bad faith or actual knowledge of a breach of the fiduciary 
obligation. Section 22-1-9, U. C.A. ( 1953), sup1~a, make8 
no exceptions for forged instruments. lt statt•s in sub-
stance that if a fiduciary makes a deposit of a ehe('k 
drawn on his principals' account, the hank receiving tlw 
('heck for d(~posit is not hound to mak0 inquiry and is 
not liable to the principal in the ahsenep of adual knowl-
1:•dge of tlu• hr<>aeh or knowlPdg<• of fads snffieif'nt to 
constitute had faith. This sections fits exa('tly the facts 
alll:'ged in the instant case. 
Appellant's argument that respondent had a dut:--' 
to its d0positors to dt>termin<' thP p;enuineness of endorsP-
111ents is not in point in thi:-; ('a'SP. Appellant was not 
all<-'gt'd to lw a dPpositor of rPspondPnt; in fad, it is 
affinuativt>ly allegPd that the elwcks \\'Pl'<' drawn on 
a PJH_•l\ant 's aecount with (ldendant v\'alkr>r Bank & Trust 
Corn pan>'. '\Vhat<>ve r rt>s pon<len t 's dut:--· to its own <lP-
pos i tors ma~· IH', it hud no <lnt>' to appt>llant to dPt<>nnim· 
th<• j..?,'('Tlllin<•l1('88 or' Pndol'S('llWl1ts WIWn dealing with appt•l-
lant's fid1wiar>· in vi<•\\' of thP pro\·ision . ..; of f·kdion :L~­
l -9, r.C.A. ( 1 ~l.):1), ~nprn. Tli<> ea.-:(' C"ite<l Ji:, amwll:rnt 
,<..,'fanrlarrl .fr1·. /!Is. ('n. 1·. I'elledio, 10+ A.~<1 ~~~, nnll 
the nrg1111wnt i11YC>h·inp: gnn rnnh·(• nl' prior c•11clon:(•!1l!'111~ 
are not in point i11 this <·:\,.:('. TlH•l'l' i:-; 110 nllPp:ation in 
Count TT ol' tlH· l•~ir:-;I Can~:c· of Af'ti(l]1, or <·],.:('Wlwn• in 
np1w1lnnt's Co111plai11t. tlint rc•;;pornh·nt µ:1wrnnt<·<·d pl'ior 
<·ndorse11w11t:-; 011 tl11· <'lt,·(·k..; i11 q1wc-:tion, Hll<l th<• Co111-
plaint dot>s not :wt forth a cause of action based upon a 
right of n-'cov<•ry for a guarantee of prior endorsements. 
POINT IV 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 22-1-5, U.C.A. (1953), 
ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INST ANT CASE. 
Section 22-1-!), F.C.A. (1953), in substance states, 
among other things, that, if a check is drawn in favor 
of a payt:•f> who knows that the transaction is for the 
henPfit of the fiduciary tl1t• payee is liable to the principal 
if thP fidneiar>· tlwreby commits a breach of his obliga-
tion. ff this seC'tion is applied to depository hanks, it is 
c·learl>· inC'onsistent ~with and C'ontrary to Seeton 22-1-9, 
1 :.C.A. ( 195:1), supra. Tlw t>ntire act, must he read to-
gdher' to deh'rrnine its intPnt and application and to 
l'Psolv<> appan•nt inC'om;istPnC'ies. In legislative construc-
tion a general provision, such as Section 22-1-3, U.C.A. 
( L95:l), sltonld not lw h1>ld to snpt•n·<·cle a speeifi<' vrovi-
sion, sneh as Seetion 22-1-9, 1-.C.,\. ( 1953). 
A n•vw\\' of thL•se sPctions, wlwn eonstrued with 
l'Plakd st>etions and in light of the Connnissioner's prP-
fatm·>· not<•s to th<' 1-niforrn Fidneiaries Act discloses 
tltnt Sedions 22-1-8 and 9, r.C.A. (195:)), were intended 
to µ;rn·<·1·11 all <h•pository hank dealings \\'ith fiduciariE>s 
to thP ex<·lusion of SPction 22-1-5, LC.A. ( 1953). In 9B, 
{'11i/or111 L11ws .1111111fated. (l~H)G), Jing<' :J;1. the Corn-
"Sections 4, 5 and G deal with holders of 
negotiable paper drawn or endorsed by fiduci-
aries." 
And at page 40, id, the note states: 
"Sections 7, 8 and 9 deal with depositories 
of fiduciary funds." 
Section 22-1-9, e.C.A. (1953), makes no exceptions 
as to who may be payres when it allows banks to ac.cept 
deposits from a fiduciary without liability to the prinei-
pal in the absence of had faith or actual knowledge of 
the breach of the fiduciary duty. Even more persuasiv1i 
that Section 22-1-5, U.C.A. (1953) does not apply to a 
depository bank, however, are the provisions of Sections 
22-1-7 and 8, U.C.A. (1953). Section 22-1-7, U.C.A. (1953), 
deals with deposits to the credit of fiduciaries and states 
in part: 
" .. If, howevt>r, sueh a check is payable to the 
draw£>e hank and is d<>liverPd to it in payment of 01· 
as sf>(•urity for a pPrsonal dt>bt of thr fiduciary to 
it, the hank is liable to tht> prineipal if thP fidn-
eiary in faet commits a hrearh of his obligation 
as fidueiary in drawing or delivPrng the ehPck." 
Section 22-1-8, CC.A. ( 195:q, involves deposits by fidu-
C'iaries in tlw na111<> of tlw prineipal, and contains exaetly 
the same language as 22-1-7, 1.1.C.A. (1953). If Section 
22-1-5, r.C.A. (195:~), \\'Pl"(-' applicable to dPpository 
banks, thPn thP quott><l provisions of Sections 22-1-7 
nnd 8, r.C.A. ( l!l;):1), would lw meaninglPss and nullitie8. 
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It is apparent that the legislature intended a differ-
Pnt treatment for depository hanks named as payee 
on checks deposited hy fiduciaries from that afforded 
hy St>ction 22-1-5, U.C.A. (1953), or it would not have 
enactt>d the ahovP quoted portions of St>ctions 22-1-7 and 
~. r.c.A. (1953). This is evPn more clear when it is 
noted that Sections 22-1-7 and 8, U.C.A. (1953), make 
no mention of a depository bank's liability to the princi-
pal when designated payee on a check unless the check is 
USl'<i in payment of or as security for a personal debt 
of the fiduiciary. No liahility is imposed for knowing the 
transaction to be for the benefit of the fiduciary. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT SUFFERED NO LOSS BY REASON 
OF THE ALLEGED ACTS OF RESPONDENT. 
Appellant's Complant alleges that all of the checks 
involved in tlw ca:se werp drawn on it:-; account with 
defendant vValkPr Bank & Tru:-;t Company. Appellant 
suffrrPd no lo:-;t-1 by reason of respondent's conduct, its 
allPg-ed loss }wing ::mstained onl~' hy tlu• alleged action 
of defrn<lant "Talker Bank & rrrust Company in wrong-
full~- eharging the <'lweks to apywllant's aceount. The two 
(•arn..:p;-; of a<·tion allPged against respondent in the Com-
plaint allege that ap1wllant\.; loss was a reRult of re-
spondent's activity, hnt n.s a matter of law such allega-
tions fail to state of (•lai111 against rPspondent upon whirh 
relief ean l>P grnnt<>d when• thP Complaint abo alll•ge~ 
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that every check was drawn against its aooount at another 
bank. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court 
ruled correctly in dismissing appellant's second Com-
plaint in Case No. 171406 for the reasons set forth 
herein. The Order of Dismissal should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
.John 11'. Pien•py 
Attorney for Respondent 
